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PATRICKWILSON 
ABSTRACT 
THEREIS AN INERADICABLE CONFLJCT between the First Amendment 
and even the narrowest copyright. Recent changes in copyright law 
have exacerbated the conflict by extension of rights over derivative 
works that could result in ownership of ideas, supposedly ruled out 
by copyright law. Minimal copyright in works of fact as opposed 
to works of fiction would reduce though not eliminate copyright 
interference with freedom of information. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a basic, built-in conflict between intellectual freedom 
and intellectual property which is directly reflected in a conflict 
between the copyright law and the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. A property right is a right to exclude others from some 
use of something; giving property rights to one is at the same time 
putting limitations on the freedom of others, and expanding property 
rights means contracting others’ areas of freedom. Intellectual 
property is in this no different from other kinds of property, though 
the particular nature of some of the main “objects” of intellectual 
property leads to unique problems of drawing the line between 
excluded uses and permitted uses, and to problematical consequences 
no matter where the line is drawn. The justification for limiting 
the use of intellectual objects is presumably this: property rights 
in intellectual objects are granted as an incentive to the production 
of more intellectual objects; some freedom is given up as the price 
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for the future enjoyment of a larger pool of valuable objects. 
“American intellectual property law can be thought of as a bargain 
between individual creators and the public. In exchange for granting 
authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and 
inventions, the American public is to benefit from the disclosure 
of inventions, the publication of writings, and the eventual return 
of both to the public domain” (U.S. Congress, 1986, p. 188). The 
question about any such bargain is whether the terms are fair. The 
bargain is a bad one if i t  fails to enlarge the pool of valuable objects 
beyond what it would otherwise have been, or if i t  grants more 
exclusionary power than needed to yield the same increase in the 
size of the pool, or if i t  grants exclusions that should not be granted 
because the grant conflicts with more fundamental values. The extent 
of property rights granted under copyright appears to have been 
expanded considerably in the 1976 revision of the copyright law; the 
terms of the bargain have changed. Before discussing this expansion, 
let us take a fresh look at the basic restrictions that copyright law 
has, in the past, placed on the use of intellectual products; the bargain 
may be an odd one in ways not quite realized. 
COPYINGAND DESCRIBING 
The “writings” of an “author” are the objects subject to 
copyright, both “writings” and “author” being understood in 
unusual ways (17 U.S. Code, 5 102). The category of writings includes 
“literary works,” which are any works expressed in verbal or 
numerical symbols and not just works of “literature”; but i t  also 
includes musical, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound 
recordings. The notion of an author is correspondingly expanded. 
Here we will consider only “literary works” because they are arguably 
basic to any question of conflict between property and intellectual 
freedom and have special characteristics that make them uniquely 
problematical. 
To be protected, a literary work must be fixed in a “tangible” 
medium of expression-i.e., i t  must exist as a written-down sequence 
or array of symbols, a recorded text. And what i t  is protected against 
is, at the very least, unauthorized literal copying-i.e., reproduction 
by others, without permission, of the same sequence or array of 
symbols. This only begins to describe the extent of protection; but 
even this basic protection against literal copying raises a basic 
problem. 
The publication of the text of a literary work counts as a public 
event and sometimes a major event. One way of describing such events 
is that the event is the making of a public statement to the world. 
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This is accurate at least for works that claim to tell something true 
about the world. Such works say: This is the way things are or were, 
or, This is the way people should think of the world or this is the 
way things should be or should not be. Such public statements are 
particular kinds of extended speech acts with the speaker addressing 
an indefinite and unknown audience (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; 
Levinson, 1987, pp. 226-83). Such speech acts can be described in 
countless ways, but there is one particular, uniquely privileged, kind 
of description. We can describe the particular type of speech act, 
or its topic or subject matter, or its major thesis-for example, that 
i t  offers a plan for protection of tropical rain forests, that it expounds 
a new theory of irregular phenomena, and so on. We might summarize 
the things said briefly or at length. But any other description we 
give, if challenged or questioned, will ultimately be backed u p  by 
repeating some or all of what was actually said or written-i.e., the 
very words used in the very order in which they were used. The 
person to whom we report on others’ speech acts can always, and 
frequently will, press us by asking, “But what did they actually say?” 
and the standard response-the response called for-is to quote 
verbatim from the utterance or published text. This is basic to the 
description of speech acts; verbatim reproduction of the words used 
furnishes a unique standard description of the act which is an 
appropriate test of the accuracy of most other kinds of reports on 
speech acts. 
But of course the production of a verbatim repetition of the words 
used in performing a speech act is just what is controlled by copyright 
law. It is the production of a copy. If a published text is protected 
by copyright, it is protected against others reporting on it using the 
unique standard description of the text, but this is certainly odd. 
For whatever the bundle of rights associated with the ideas of freedom 
of speech and of the press, i t  surely must be thought to include the 
right to read and watch and listen, and the right to tell others what 
one has read, seen, and heard, and specifically the right to tell others 
as precisely and accurately as possible what one has read, seen, and 
heard. There are further rights such as to criticize, for example. But 
the further rights seem to presuppose a prior right to report. The 
right to criticize would be of little value if one were not free first 
to describe what one was criticizing. And it  is at least a bizarre rule 
that would allow reporting-but not reporting that was as precise 
and accurate as possible-that would allow reports of public 
statements to the world only so long as those reports were not “too 
accurate.” Yet this seems to be what basic copyright does-it forbids 
certain descriptions of speech acts as impermissibly accurate. 
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One might say that this odd property of copyright was of no  
practical importance whatever-i.e., that no one cares if reporting 
is done in private, and that there is no need to engage in such 
“maximally precise and accurate reporting” in public. Even if that 
were true, i t  would still leave us with a prima facie conflict between 
copyright and the First Amendment. By restricting the freedom to 
produce a certain kind of description of a certain category of public 
events, the copyright law certainly looks like a law that abridges 
freedom of speech and of the press. But the First Amendment of 
the Constitution says that Congress shall make no law that does 
this. 
Note that we cannot, by verbal description, produce copies of 
the other kinds of objects protected by copyright; “literary works” 
really are in a different category. A verbal description, no matter 
how detailed, never becomes a copy of a painting or motion picture. 
Only musical works-scores and not recorded performances-share 
this feature with literary works, that decribing (note by note) can 
amount to producing a copy, though a verbal description of a score 
is an unusably awkward sort of copy of the score (compare Goodman, 
1968). It is this special characteristic of symbolic systems that is at 
the root of the sharpest conflict between intellectual freedom and 
intellectual property. The very nature of symbolic systems guarantees 
the conflict. 
It might be argued that the story discussed earlier is mistaken 
about “making a public statement.” Publication should not be 
described that way. Publication is rather an invitation to the public 
to buy a copy of what the author has to say-i.e., not a public saying 
but a public offer to “say” privately. But this simply relocates the 
basic problem, for now what is forbidden is an overly accurate 
description of what is up  for sale. In other cases of goods for sale 
i t  would seem crazy to forbid a maximally accurate description of 
what was .for sale. Here, however, it  is explicitly forbidden. You may 
not be told what is being offered for sale except in general terms 
lest, by being told what is for sale, you come to acquire i t  and therefore 
lose interest in buying it (Arrow, 1971, p. 148). Copyright forbids 
certain kinds of description of public events. 
As defenders of copyright are quick to point out, copyright is 
far from being the only limitation on freedom of speech that the 
courts have permitted (Patry, 1985, p. 467; Pool, 1983, pp. 55-74; Stone, 
1983, pp. 1425-31; Levy, 1987, pp. 238-42; U.S. Congress, 1988). Laws 
against blasphemy, obscenity, seditious libel, fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, limitations on the rights of scientists to publish 
or even publicly discuss their research have regularly been enacted 
by legislatures and upheld or not overturned by courts. Almost no  
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one reads the “no” in “no law abridging freedom of speech and 
of the press” to mcan “not any at all.” The Constitution does indeed 
say “no law,” but the Constitution requires interpretation, and under 
judicial interpretation, “no law” is found consistent with many laws 
limiting intellectual freedom. Not being lawyers or judges, we may 
be permitted to wonder how this can be. 
IDEAAND EXPRESSION 
Legal scholars argue that two factors eliminate any real conflict 
between copyright and the First Amendment. The first is that 
copyright extends only to expression and not to ideas expressed; the 
second is that fair use allows some unauthorized use even of protected 
expression. 
The first of these factors was given statutory recognition in the 
1976 Copyright Revision Act; copyright protection does not extend 
to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which i t  is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such works” (17 U.S.C. § 102 
[1976]). It is generally understood that this means that information 
is not subject to copyright; facts, data, and pieces of information 
cannot be copyrighted (Francione, 1986). People cannot be prevented 
from borrowing and using the concepts and facts presented in a work, 
though they can be prevented from copying the text itself. If copyright 
did protect ideas, “there would certainly be a serious encroachment 
upon first amendment values,” said the chief authority on the subject, 
Melville Nimmer (1970), but since ideas are “free as air” (Brandeis 
cited in Gorman, 1982, p. 577), since copyright places no restriction 
on the use of the information contained in a work, i t  imposes no 
significant limit on First Amendment freedoms (Denicola, 1979; 
Nimmer & Nimmer, 1990). 
The idea/expression distinction is not, however, an easy one to 
make clear or to apply in practice. If the term expression referred 
to the text of a literary work-that is, the bare string or array of 
symbols-while the term idea referred to the meaning or content 
of the text, there would be a real distinction; one, moreover, that 
corresponds to commonsense notions of the relation between words 
and ideas, words being thought of as vehicles for the communication 
of ideas from one mind to another (Reddy, 1979). Copyright would 
protect the vehicle, not the ideas (concepts, propositions, notions) 
conveyed. 
But this cannot be the distinction. If i t  were, copyright would 
not protect against paraphrase or translation, both of which are 
attempts to express the same ideas but to express them differently, 
in the same or different language. A translation from English into 
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Hungarian may not share a single word with the original, and, if 
copyright protected only the original verbal surface, unauthorized 
translation would be no infringement, but i t  is. And “in Copyright 
law paraphrasing is equivalent to outright copying” (Nimmer & 
Nimmer, 1990, vol. 3, pp. 13-202 quoting Donald v. Meyer’s T V  Sales 
and Service, 426 F. 2d 1027 [Tex. Cir. 19701). Hence the idealexpression 
distinction is not a straightforward one between a text (string of 
symbols) and its content. Long ago, Judge Learned Hand wrote that 
“copyright cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist 
would escape by immaterial variations” (Nichols u. Universal Pictures 
Corporation, 1930).If expression is protected, but (expression) is more 
than the text of the protected work, what is it and how is it 
distinguished from unprotectable idea? 
The reigning view seems to be that idea and expression represent 
two poles of a continuum of overall similarity (Nimmer & Nimmer, 
1990, vol. 3, sect. 13.03). Surface verbal similarity is part, but only 
part, of the reckoning. Beyond verbal similarity, a work may be found 
to infringe on copyright because it resembles another work too closely 
in, for instance, the structure of character and action portrayed (at 
least if it is a work of fiction). Two stories might be held to be 
“impermissibly similar” though their texts had no words in common 
and though one was not a translation of the other, because the subject 
matter of the one tracked that of the other too closely-e.g., involving 
similar characters doing similar things, or “similarities of treatment, 
details, scenes, events, and characterization” (Reyher u. Children’s 
Teleuision Workshop,  1976, p. 91). Too much “borrowing” not only 
of verbal surface but of content counts as borrowing “expression” 
rather than “idea.” Judge Learned Hand’s “abstractions test” is 
usually referred to as expressing the distinction (Nichols  u.Uniuersal 
Pictures Corporation, 1930): a work can be described in terms of 
patterns or schemata of increasing abstractness, and two works may 
resemble each other by both instantiating a pattern at one level of 
generality or abstractness while differing at the next level of specificity. 
If they resemble each other only at a high level of abstractness, they 
resemble only in “idea,” while if they resemble each other at a low 
level of abstractness (high level of concreteness or specificity), their 
resemblance is one of “expression.” 
So how do we distinguish using “expression” (forbidden) from 
using “idea” (permitted)? The answer is discouraging: “Obviously, 
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond 
copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression’ ... the test for 
infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague ... [and] decisions 
must therefore be inevitably ad hod’ (Peter Pan Fabrics, Znc. u. Martin 
Weiner Corp., 1960, p. 489). This is not surprising if what is required 
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is not to distinguish uses of material from different realms (form 
versus content, symbols versus what they symbolize, words versus 
concepts) but to judge degree of overall similarity of form and content. 
It has the consequence that Judge Hand noted: “Nobody has ever 
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can...the line, 
wherever i t  is drawn, will seem arbitrary” (Nichols u. Universal 
Pictures Corporation, 1930, p. 122). And no  general line can be drawn; 
each case must be considered ad hoc. What is allowed and what is 
forbidden cannot be told in advance; appeal to an idea/expression 
distinction simply amounts to asserting that copyright permits uses 
that result in works that are not too similar to the original without 
giving us any rule for telling how similar is too similar. It is hard 
to see how this distinction could guarantee that there will be no 
serious conflict between copyright and the First Amendment. It is 
not going to be comforting to be told that we are free to borrow 
the “ideas” expressed in a work i f  that means only “the most general 
ideas” and not the “specific details”; and can i t  be satisfactory that 
the boundary between the permitted and the forbidden cannot be 
described or predicted in advance even in principle? 
DERIVATIVERIGHTS 
“There has been a quiet revolution in copyright law and the copyright 
industries. Copyright, which once protected against only the 
production of substantially similar copies in the same medium as 
the copyrighted work, today protects against uses and media that 
often lie far afield from the original” (Goldstein, 1983, p. 209; compare 
Brown, 1984). The 1976 revision of copyright law has many notable 
features, some of which are well known and some not (for an extended 
review see Zissu, 1986). Copyright was made automatic upon the first 
production of a “tangible expression.” The term of copyright was 
extended to life plus fifty years. Protection was granted not just to 
works of specified kinds, but to “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, n o w  k n o w n  or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, later reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device 
(17 U.S.C. 3 102 [1976]). Rules were laid out for library photocopying, 
and supplemented by guidelines on  interlibrary provision of 
photocopies proposed by the National Commission on  New 
Technological Uses for Copyrighted Works (CONTU). The “idea/ 
expression” distinction was formally incorporated into the law, as 
was the fair use doctrine. The  1976 act hedged on treatment of 
computer programs, and CONTU was charged with formulating 
proposals for subsequent action. The CONTU proposals, extending 
copyright protection to computer programs, were adopted by 
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Congress in 1980 as an amendment to the 1976 act (National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 
1979). These changes are highly significant, but for our purposes 
the most striking change in the law is this addition to the list of 
exclusive rights conferred by copyright: “to prepare derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work” (17 U.S.C. 3 106 [1976]). The act 
defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any  other 
form in wh ich  a work  may  be recast, transformed, or adapted” 
(emphasis added) (17 U.S.C. 3 101 [1976]). This is a long way from 
the simple right to make copies. It was not until 1880 that copyright 
law even recognized a copyright holder’s exclusive right to “dramatize 
or translate their own works,” a German translation of Uncle  Tom’s 
Cabin having been held noninfringing in 1853 (Goldstein, 1983, p. 
213). In 1909 the right to abridge was added, along with the right 
to “make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work” (Copyright 
Act of 1909, sect. 1). As the 1976 act extended the scope of copyright 
to works in any tangible medium of expression, n o w  k n o w n  or later 
developed, so i t  extended the rights of the copyright holder not just 
to make particular types of derivative works, but to produce works 
based on an earlier original and subjected to any  kind of recasting, 
transformation, or adaptation. Taken at face value, this represents 
a huge extension of proprietary rights, and a correspondingly huge 
restriction on others’ freedom to make use of a work. And it casts 
doubt on the claim that copyright protects only expression and not 
the ideas expressed. 
Let us try to imagine how we might proceed if we did want 
to grant ownership in the ideas expressed in a literary work (for 
a different view see Hopkins, 1982). To be at all plausible, our 
procedure would either have to require a proof of the novelty of 
ideas expressed (similar to the patent system’s requirement of novelty 
but sharply different from copyright’s minimal requirement of 
“originality” which is simply “not copied”), or else would have to 
give rights not to particular ideas but rather to a complex structure 
of ideas. A person who writes an article about copyright is not going 
to be given property rights in the bare idea of a work, or of a copy, 
or of a right; it will have to be either a demonstrably new idea or 
else a particular structure of ideas-say, the entire conceptual structure 
expressed in a written work (the “unique and protected mosaic” as 
Judge Kaufman puts i t  [Harper  pi7 Row Publishers u. N a t i o n  
Enterprises, 19831). Let us put aside the case of the “demonstrably 
new idea” (interesting though i t  be) and concentrate on the case 
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of the structure of ideas. How would we go about protecting the 
ideas, the conceptual structure, the intellectual content, of a literary 
work? The first things we would prohibit would be: translation, 
paraphrase, summarization, reorganization or rearrangement of 
content, making popularizations, writing expanded versions of the 
original, writing “imitations” of the original in which one tried 
to “translate” the original into a new subject area or apply i t  in 
a new way. One would try to prevent other uses as well-indirect 
uses such as doing other things that necessarily assume or presuppose 
the protected ideas. But prohibition of copying and of making 
derivative works would come first. To cover all bases, one would 
forbid not just a specific list of prohibited types of use but would 
include an indefinite omnibus clause prohibiting “any other form 
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” In other 
words, one would take one’s wording from the 1976 Copyright Act. 
The steps one would take, in what almost everyone would agree was 
an unconstitutional grant of property in ideas, are largely the same 
steps that have already been taken. The  more unauthorized 
transformations of a text we forbid, the greater the control we are 
giving the copyright holder over the content of the text; if we forbid 
all transformations of a text, we are giving, as nearly as we practically 
can, complete control over the content. When we remember that 
copyright forbids not only copying of whole works but of any 
quantitatively or qualitatively substantial part  (and what is 
substantial can be a couple of hundred words out of hundreds of 
thousands), we see that what is forbidden now looks like this: i t  
is forbidden to produce works containing “substantial” parts copied 
from or based on parts of an original or any transformation of the 
original. This cannot be compatible with any ordinary understanding 
of intellectual freedom. 
FAIRUSE 
If the idea/expression distinction fails to resolve the First 
Amendment conflict, and if new derivative rights appear to exacerbate 
it ,  the whole burden now falls on the doctrine of fair use which 
has, in the past, been seen as a “cure-all” for such problems (Francione, 
1986, p. 522). The 1976 Act, for the first time, codified the doctrine, 
saying that “the fair use of a copyrighted work, for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...is not an  
infringementof copyright” (17 U.S.C. 3 107 [19761). There is no  precise 
rule for determining fair use; a non-exhaustive list of factors to be 
considered in  deciding fairness of use includes purpose, the nature 
of the work, the amount and “substantiality” of the portion used 
in relation to the whole work, and the effect of the use on the potential 
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market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Other factors are taken 
into account at times (the public interest, “good faith,” “fair 
dealing”), but i t  is generally agreed, by commentators and recently 
by the Supreme Court, that the effect on the market for the copyrighted 
work “is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use” 
(Harper Q R o w ,  Publishers u. Nat ion  Enterprises, 1985, 2233). The 
fact that only a small part of a copyrighted work is copied will not 
suffice to satisfy courts of fair use; in the important case of Harper 
Q R o w  u. Nation,  the majority of the Supreme Court found that 
the Nation had infringed the copyright in ex-President Ford’s memoirs 
by publishing an article that quoted 300 of the more than 200,000 
words of the original. Even a small amount of quotation and 
paraphrase can be found detrimental to the market for the original 
work. It is important to remember that there are two distinct elements 
in the question of market effect: potential (not necessarily actual) 
effect on the market for the work allegedly infringed, and potential 
effect on the market for derivative works based on that original. Courts 
have apparently not so far taken markets for derivative works much 
into account, but have “generally inclined to identify potential 
markets with the market in which the work was first introduced,” 
a “persistent error” according to Goldstein (1983, p. 233). Uses of 
copyrighted works that might be considered fair when only the effect 
on the original was considered could be thought unfair if they might 
have an effect on a derivative work that the author of the original 
has made, intends to make, or might sometime intends to make. 
The limitations of the fair use defense in resolving conflicts 
between intellectual freedom and intellectual property (application 
of the fair use doctrine being primarily concerned with protection 
of markets) is suggested not only by Harper & Row but also by the 
case of Wainwright  Securities u. Wall Street Transcript Corp. (1977). 
Wainwright produced reports on corporations, analyzing finances, 
profit expectations, strengths and weaknesses, etc.; the Transcript 
published abstracts of the Wainwright reports. Wainwright sued, 
alleging copyright infringement and unfair trade practices. The 
Transcript argued that its use of the reports was a fair use, that 
publication of the abstracts was simply “financial news coverage 
entitled to the protection of the first amendment” (wa inwr igh t  
Securities u. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 1977, p. 95). They pointed 
out that T h e  Wall Street Journal also reported the Wainwright 
publications as news events, including accounts of the analyses and 
conclusions of the original reports. Admitting that “the question 
of the first amendment protections due a news report of a copyrighted 
research report is a provocative one” (p. 95), the court held on appeal 
that “the Transcript appropriated almost verbatim the most creative 
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and original aspects of the reports” (p. 96), and that i t  had “the 
obvious intent, if not the effect, of fulfilling the demand for the 
original work” (p. 96). This was not legitimate news coverage or 
fair use but rather “chiseling for personal profit” (p. 97). 
It is clear (and emphasized in the Supreme Court decision on 
Harper & Row) that the fact that an abstract is offered as a news 
report is not sufficient to establish that it is fair use; “the fact that 
an article arguably is ‘news’ and therefore a productive use is simply 
one factor in a fair use analysis” (Harperclr Row, Publishers u. Nation 
Enterprises, 1985, p. 2231), and not necessarily a determinative one. 
T h e  Wall Street Journal had presumably not adversely affected 
Wainwright’s market even though it too quoted extensively from the 
originals and reported significant findings. Denicola (1979) thinks 
that the Transcript made “significantly greater use of plaintiff’s 
expression than was necessary” to report on the publication (p. 312. 
Compare with Gorman, 1982, pp. 576-78). This suggests that 
paraphrase would have been acceptable instead of direct quotation, 
but it was the reporting of significant findings (“the most creative 
and original aspects of the reports”) that produced the putative effect 
on the market, and paraphrase would have had the same effect (and 
paraphrase is equivalent to “outright copying,” though Gorman 
[19821 suggests that “even substantial paraphrasing” might have been 
tolerated if the abstracts had incorporated critical. assessments of 
Wainwright’s reports [p. 5781). 
Given decisions such as this, i t  is  clearly in the interest of 
producers and publishers of abstracts to claim that abstracts are not 
derivative works and do not substitute for the originals (see Lieb, 
1980; Cambridge Research Institute, 1973, pp. 164-65; Weil et al., 1983a; 
Weil et al., 1983b). This is, of course, clearly false in many cases. 
An abstract (an informative abstract at any rate, as opposed to an 
indicative or descriptive one) is a short abridgement, which implies 
either that it is a derivative work or that only length makes the 
difference between (derivative) abridgements and (nonderivative) 
abstracts, which is implausible. And for the user, abstracts, like review 
articles and syntheses, do indeed of ten substitute for the originals; 
that is their great merit (Bernier, 1968). If abstracts are derivative 
works and so forbidden unless authorized, or if they are not derivative 
works but may nevertheless be forbidden because they adversely affect 
a market, the conclusion seems inescapable that appeal to fair use 
will not suffice to avoid damaging limitations on the freedom of 
information. The system of communication that we depend on 
requires not only the production of original intellectual products, 
but of the communication of various forms of information about 
those products. The system of communication cannot be subject to 
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the limitation that nothing flowing through it  may adversely affect 
the market for any original work; if anything is an impermissible 
limitation on freedom of speech, this looks like it. As Denicola (1979) 
says, the fair use defense removes “those barriers to use that are not 
needed to preserve the economic incentive to produce,” but “the first 
amendment, however, demands much more ...when the objective of 
free speech requires access to the expression of another, the property 
interest created by copyright law must yield, regardless of the 
economic impact” (p. 303). It would be a mockery to say that free 
speech is protected just up to the point at which it  begins to affect 
commercial interests. 
There is a way of reconciling copyright and the First Amendment, 
however, at least for one great category of copyrighted works-i.e.,the 
“factual” as opposed to the “fictional.” 
FACT, FICTION, FUNCTION 
The development of new information technology has exacerbated 
the conflicts inherent in copyright law in ways described in a wide- 
ranging survey by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 
Zntellectual Property Rights  in an Age of Electronics and Information 
(1986). The vastly increased ability of private citizens as well as 
commercial and noncommercial organizations to copy, manipulate, 
and transmit vast quantities of information quickly and cheaply has 
changed the copyright environment in ways still not well understood. 
The ability of copyright holders to enforce their rights to copy is 
lessened by the widespread availability of computers and digitally- 
stored information. The ability and the incentives to create new 
information products have increased stupendously, but the copyright 
ban on unauthorized production of derivative works makes it  
dangerous to take advantage of the ability (Office of Technology 
Assessment [OTA], 1986, pp. 162-65. See also Warrick, 1984). These 
are central, but by no means the only, problems of copyright in the 
information age. 
The OTA report bravely raises the question of whether copyright 
should be thought of as proprietary at all, rather than as regulatory, 
confined to the commercial exploitation of intellectual products 
(Office of Technology Assessment, 1986, pp. 190-93. See also 
Zimmerman, 1986). (If regulatory, private use would not be limited 
by copyright while, if proprietary, private use would be subject to 
control.) It proposes that the time may have come to abandon a 
uniform system of copyright protection for all types of works, and 
suggests the need to consider different treatment for works falling 
into the three categories of works of “art,” works of “fact,” and 
“functional works”-i.e., those that describe procedures or, like 
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computer programs, both describe and actually implement a 
procedure (Office of Technology Assessment [OTA], 1986, pp. 64- 
88). This suggestion seems particularly appropriate in the context 
of First Amendment conflicts (though that was not one of OTAs 
concerns). 
The writers of the OTA report were thinking of a trichotomy 
of all the kinds of copyrightable objects, but let us confine our 
attention only to “literary works,” excluding computer programs 
from that category (to which they were assigned as a result of the 
CONTU recommendations, which may turn out to be a mistake), 
and consider only a dichotomy of works of “fact” and works of 
“fiction.” (The category of works of “fiction” is intentionally 
narrower than that of works of “literature”; historical works, for 
instance, may well be considered works of literature but will count 
as works of “fact.”) Let us suppose that works of fiction are given 
the full range of protection currently given them subject to the “idea/ 
expression” limitation in its incorrigibly vague form (and let us admit 
frankly that this amounts to protection of ideas in an everyday 
nonlegal sense). For works of fact, let us suppose that no protection 
is granted beyond protection against substantially complete and literal 
copying, thus returning to the earliest understanding of copyright 
protection. 
One might justify “thick” protection of works of fiction on the 
following grounds: the characters and incidents of a novel or play 
are (at least in prototypical cases) invented by the author, and the 
speech act i n  which they are presented to the world has the somewhat 
paradoxical characteristic of “bringing truths into existence” (this 
is not the orthodox view of speech acts. For that orthodox view, 
see Searle, 1979). That is, if the author writes that the character George 
murdered his brother, this is now a “fact” in the imaginary world 
created and populated by the author; i t  would make no sense for 
subsequent writers to try to show that George “really” did not commit 
a murder. That is a distinguishing feature of imaginative, as opposed 
to “factual,” works. If you can be said to have created a world, you 
might plausibly be given rights not only over the text of the work 
that presented that world, but over the “world” itself, the particular 
imaginary world of the work. Protection might thus be “thick,” 
extending not just to the verbal surface but to the “world” behind 
that surface. 
For works of fact, a new standard of infringement would have 
to replace the idea/expression distinction-say, a “fact/expression” 
distinction: the facts presented are not copyrightable, only the very 
words used to present or express them. (Here one could appeal to 
the “clear distinction” test of the case of Baker u. Selden, a test very 
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different from the idea/expression distinction [101U.S. 3 841. Compare 
the discussion in OTA, 1986, pp. 62-63].) On that understanding, 
if we take the facts presented in a work and use them to create a 
new work, we cannot infringe copyright, for the facts are not subject 
to copyright. Questions of fair use do not arise if what was used 
was factual matter rather than the verbal surface of the work. 
Infringement would be a matter of “substantial taking” of 
expression-i.e., verbatim text. The idea/expression distinction as 
usually understood would not apply: substantial similarity of overall 
content would not constitute infringement, since content (the factual 
matter itself) was not copyrightable at all. “Infringement of copyright 
must [in such cases] be based on a taking of literary form, as opposed 
to the ideas or information ...” (Harfler 6 Row, Publishers u. Nation 
Enterpises, p. 2242). Francione (1986) argues at length that “for 
logical and practical reasons the infringement standards for fictional 
and factual works must be different,” as “the distinction between 
fact and expression is simply different from the distinction between 
idea and expression” (p. 566). He may not be right in claiming that 
the standards must be different; the proposal here is that they should 
be different in order to avoid the conflict between intellectual property 
and intellectual freedom. 
To some degree, this distinction between “thin” protection for 
factual works and “thick” protection for works of imagination is 
already recognized by the courts, the protection afforded factual works 
being generally “thinner” than that afforded works of imagination 
(see especially Gorman, 1982). But protection for works of fact is 
far from the minimum proposed. Presumably the “thinning” of 
protection for factual works could come about by the evolution of 
judicial interpretation (on this subject, see Levi, 1949; Dworkin, 1986). 
But working against the recognition of only “thin” protection for 
works of fact are at least three distinct features. First, there is the 
courts’ apparent inclination toward a “labor theory of copyright,” 
affording protection to works of fact to compensate for the labor 
expended in their preparation even though their contents are, in 
theory, unprotectable. Despite their overt recognition that facts and 
information are not protectable, courts have of ten, explicitly or 
implicitly, decided for relatively “thick” protection of factual works 
as a way of recognizing the effort going into their production. There 
will be no copyright incentive to produce works like directories, the 
contents of which are preeminently pieces of unprotectable 
information if  others are allowed to take the information and 
rearrange it at will, but incentives must be protected. Francione 
describes in detail the strategies by which protection is granted to 
bodies of information that could not be granted to separate pieces 
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of the “body.” There is a fatal analogy between surface and content 
that may be at work here. Words are not separately copyrightable 
but strings of words are. Why not also say that, though individual 
pieces of information are not copyrightable, collections of such pieces 
are? So “Although individual facts and their unadorned expression 
are not protected by copyright, the law has chosen to ignore the 
dictates of algebra and affords to the summation of one hundred 
or one million such elements a significant measure of protection” 
(Denicola, 1981, p. 527). He thinks that is appropriate; but protecting 
a body of information against copying, reformulation, and 
transformation is protection of content, and it is clear to others that 
in many cases courts “have in a pragmatic sense afforded protection 
to simple ideas” (Hopkins, 1982, p. 405). 
Which leads directly to the second point, that of derivative rights. 
Standard copyright doctrine has it that “compilations,” which are 
collections of facts or pieces of information, are copyrightable but 
that only their arrangement and, at least in some cases, their selection 
is protected (Denicola, 1979; Francione, 1986, p. 593). The lay observer 
would conclude that rearrangement and reorganization of a 
compilation would not be infringing, and some court decisions lend 
support to this view. For instance, in the case of N e w  York T i m e s  
Co. u. Roxbury  Data Interface, Inc., Roxbury prepared a cumulated 
personal name index to the N e w  York T i m e s  Index and the Tames 
sued for infringement but lost (434 F.Supp 217. Compare Gorman, 
1982, pp. 574-75; Denicola, 1979, pp. 532-33). But could one count 
on such re-uses of data being regularly allowed? No, for another 
court might well find such an index to an index to be a derivative 
work, “and that the right to create that new index was within the 
plaintiff’s copyright monopoly” (Gorman, 1982, p. 575). The problem 
is a general one in that even if the content of a work consists of 
unprotectable facts or information, if there is a clear relation of 
transformation between an original work and another work, the other 
may be held to be an impermissible derivative work. It is futile to 
try to guess how judges are going to interpret the derivative right 
clause of the copyright act; but the prohibition against unauthorized 
derivative works stands, as Gorman (1982) notes about the First 
Amendment, as a “brooding omnipresence” over the copyright 
environment (p. 586). The idea of one work being a copyright 
infringement because it  is based on another, and hence a derivative 
work, is a rich potential source of conflict. 
The third and perhaps the major barrier to full recognition of 
a different status for works of fact and works of fiction is the copyright 
doctrine that paraphrase is equivalent to copying. Again the special 
nature of symbolic products complicates the picture; for if the text 
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of a factual work is protected against paraphrase, the ability to make 
use of the content of factual works is restricted. 
The way this works is as follows. Suppose one text presents a 
series of “facts.” Since facts are not copyrightable, it must be 
permissible to use them, in particular to communicate these facts 
to others. But if both the new text and the original text succeed 
in communicating the same facts, then the new text will look like 
a paraphrase of the first text. For the main test of a good paraphrase 
of a text is whether it serves as well as the original to communicate 
the information conveyed by the original; and conversely, if one text 
serves as well as another for that purpose, i t  stands in the relation 
of being a paraphrase to that other text. If the fact to be conveyed 
is that George murdered his brother, then any text that does convey 
that fact (directly at least, not just by implication) will do so because 
it is another way of saying that George murdered his brother. But 
then, by copyright doctrine, i t  is impermissibly similar to the original. 
But any text that managed to convey the fact in question would 
be impermissibly similar; if all impermissibly similar expressions 
are forbidden, i t  is not permitted to use the fact that George murdered 
his brother except indirectly or nonverbally. 
Copyright doctrine has long recognized, at least in a few cases, 
that there is no practical alternative to allowing direct quotation: 
idea and expression “merge,” and one must allow use of verbal 
expression on pain of granting monopoly ownership in a fact (see 
Francione, 1986, p. 573). But the generality of the problem seems 
not to have been acknowledged, though at least one court has come 
close, noting that: “Factual works are different. Subsequent authors 
wishing to express the ideas contained in a factual work often can 
choose from only a narrow range of expression” and noting, 
significantly, about one statement that “just about any subsequent 
expression of that idea is likely to appear to be a substantially similar 
paraphrase of the words with which Landsberg expressed the idea” 
(Landsberg u. Scrabble Crossword Game  Players, Znc., 1984, p. 488). 
But no one seems to have made the point in full generality (Francione 
comes closest but apparently cannot bring himself to talk bluntly 
in terms of paraphrase. See Francione, 1986, pp. 570-75).The court’s 
odd phrase “substantially similar paraphrase” is telling; for outsiders, 
the whole point of paraphrase is to convey the information of the 
original, and the idea of a paraphrase that was not in that sense 
“substantially similar” is the idea of a poor paraphrase. The better 
a paraphrase, the worse it is in copyright. But it has to be stated 
as bluntly and forcefully as possible: forbidding paraphrase, or 
forbidding good paraphrase, amounts to forbidding use of the fact 
or information conveyed by the text paraphrased. The ban on 
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paraphase is flatly inconsistent with the ban on copyright in fact 
or information. As long as the ban on paraphrase continues, copyright 
in factual works will continue to present conflicts with the First 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The extenion of derivative rights to apply to “any...form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted” is potentially the 
means of drastic further curtailment on the freedom to use ideas 
and information presented in copyrighted works-only potentially, 
for all depends on how courts come to understand the new wording 
of the law. When it comes to works of art and entertainment, we 
may not find the expansion of property rights of much concern from 
the point of view of intellectual freedom; does it matter, from that 
point of view, that we are forbidden to make rock videos or interactive 
computer graphics based on someone’s short story or poem? When 
i t  comes to works of fact, however, the matter is different. The freedom 
to use and, in particular, to inform others about information is not 
one we can afford to see curtailed. 
But as we have seen, even the thinnest copyright does have that 
effect-i.e., the inability to quote prevents the most accurate 
description of others’ speech acts. The conflict between intellectual 
freedom and intellectual property is guaranteed by the basic character 
of linguistic communication-that accurate description produces a 
copy or a paraphrase of what is said. In the past, the fair use doctrine 
was held to provide the needed loopholes that would mitigate the 
conflict. Recent constricted applications of that doctrine reduce the 
number of loopholes (without closing them all, to be sure). As long 
as copyright in works of fact is granted, the conflict will continue. 
Since those with economic interests in copyright are certain to keep 
up  pressure wherever and whenever possible to preserve and extend 
the range of protection, those concerned with intellectual freedom 
have to face the prospect of perpetual struggle to preserve the freedom 
to communicate and to use publicly available information. 
It is inevitable that the question of incentives for the production 
of factual works should arise, however, whenever i t  is proposed that 
copyright protection for factual works should be thin and protect 
only against exact copying. The idea was, as we saw at the beginning, 
that copyright was a bargain made to increase production of 
intellectual products; but if copyright does not extend to factual 
information, it hardly provides incentives to the production of new 
factual information. And in fact this is so; scientists and scholars 
do not do original research they would otherwise not do in the 
expectation of making money by the sale of copies of their books 
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or journal articles (or of movie rights). Basic scientific research is 
directly subsidized, mostly by governments; scholarly research is 
subsidized too by academic appointments that allow time and provide 
some resources for research (of ten insufficient, but not seriously 
supplemented by sale of copies of books). Government itself collects 
basic economic and social information and supports applied research 
in agriculture and medicine. In these areas i t  is not research that 
is supported by copyright but the publishing industry. If the copyright 
bargain was made in the hope of thereby increasing the supply of 
new factual information, of new knowledge, it is a bargain that was 
badly made for i t  does not have that result. And if the result of the 
bargain is that rights to use information are restricted, i t  is doubly 
bad, giving away what should not have been given away without 
any return. 
Author’s Note: An earlier version of this paper was read at the 
session on “Information as Intellectual Property” at the 49th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society for Information Science, October 
2, 1986. 
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